

Ex # 1879

Doc. No. 5425

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Each page of the attached annexure comprising in all 15 pages was imprinted by OSAKI Toshihiko with his right thumb in my presence at Sugamo Prison, Tokyo, and the contents were sworn to be true before me this eighth day of August one thousand nine hundred and forty-six.

/s/ H. G. Williams, Major

Investigating Officer

2 Aust War Crimes Sec

Statement Concerning the British POW's on BALLALE Island
by Norihiko OZUMI, former Chief of the 18th Naval Construction
Battalion stationed on the Island. /Fingerprint/

(1) Foreword

As I am about to state my past life on BALLALE Island which was led under pressure and uncertainty by merely relying upon my memory, there may be some inaccuracies as regards the dates, time and figures, but same will probably become clarified by your referring to the corresponding Army or Navy records dealing with that time which are probably in your hands, which please note.

(2) Outline of Developments

(a) After my Battalion had failed twice in advancing to Guadalcanal Island, we immediately (on about 26 or 27 November 1942) left Buin on Bougainville Island, where we were standing by for Ballale Island, on receipt of orders to promptly construct an airfield on the said island.

(b) At that time this island was uninhabited. Although small, a preliminary survey and preparations had been made in outline on the island beforehand in order to reinforce the Buin airfield. My battalion consisted of some 120 petty officers and men as well as about 800 construction workmen and its working efficiency was extremely low.

The order from the 11th Air Fleet to which our battalion belonged stated: "Work under the direction of the Commander of the 26th Air Squadron, finish the construction of an airfield in outline in 45 days (?); the laborers will be reinforced by some 4,000 (?) men.

However, although we waited impatiently, the reinforcement of 4,000 men never arrived, and although workmen despatched by the 4th Construction and Service Department on Truk Island arrived temporarily, they were made to move up to Munda again after only about 2 days' stay (the majority of them being invalids, it was only natural that not much working power could be expected of the men of this unit.

In the circumstances, our battalion proceeded to ask for the military forces on Bougainville Island to aid us in our work and to send paymasters, 2nd lieutenants (Med.) and other necessary /T.N. Battalion/ personnel to the nearby islands such as Bougainville, Shortland and Fauro so as to employ natives by propagation in various places and to make use of their working power.

(c) It was perhaps a few days after having proceeded to the island when one evening a fairly large transport cast anchor there suddenly and hundreds of persons who looked like POWs began to land on this island. Before long

the commanding officer, an Army 2nd Lieutenant (according to my memory) came to see me and remarked, "I have brought along 527 (?) Army POW's from Rabaul by order. You may use them in constructing the airfield at your place." However, due to not having received any instructions or orders from any of my command channels such as the Supreme Naval Headquarters or the 26th Air Squadron, at first I declined his proposal.

But the military officer said, "That would put me in an awful fix. As a matter of fact, I have been ordered to depart on another mission as soon as the landing of the POW's is over. As soon as I return to my post, I will have matters duly settled through my seniors. It is the Army's duty to look after all the supervision, directing and controlling of the POW's on the island. The 18 military guards whom I have brought here for that reason will be stationed with the POW's throughout the whole of the period until their duties are over. You had better make use only of their working power at this time of shortage of same, hadn't you?" I replied, "As for our battalion, it would be very good to make use of them for some suitable work, but it would be embarrassing for me too to bear troublesome responsibility as I have not been contacted at all in the matter by my seniors. The only thing is that I feel confident of bearing utmost responsibility only as regards feeding them, apart from which I cannot do anything. Could only that be sufficient?" "Yes. It would be O.K. at that." After the foregoing controversy, I made up my mind to "take care of them for the time being" until instructions should come from my naval immediate superiors. (After all I received neither any instructions nor orders whatsoever to the very last).

(d) By this time, a 12 cm. AA Company commanded by Naval 1st Lieutenant MIYAKE had already been stationed on this island besides our battalion. In addition to the foregoing, a 12 cm. AA Company commanded by Naval 1st Lieutenant KIMBARA, an 8 cm. AA Company commanded by 2nd Lieutenant TAKAHASHI and half a 13 mm. AA M.G. division (maybe one division) were scheduled to advance to this island and engage in guard duties in the near future, but none of them had arrived there at that time except the above-mentioned MIYAKE Company.

Moreover, a force of about 2 battalions strong was scheduled to proceed to the island mainly to assist us in constructing our airfield with the understanding of the military forces at ERENTA /phonetic/ on Bougainville Island who were waiting for the arrival of equipment from Japan proper.

(e) It was in the aforesaid manner that over 500 POW's were forced upon me, and although I felt greatly obliged for the supply of a considerable amount of working power at a time of shortage thereof, I was placed at my wit's end as I had never for a moment expected such a thing, as well as had never received any orders or instructions as to how to treat them, especially as I had no experience.

Here I shall explain my predicament in full detail. I am originally an engineering officer graduated from the Naval Engineering College, and was

called up to duty from the First Reserve. In the Japanese Navy the Naval Command Observance Regulations /T.M. "Gunrei Shoko Rei/ have hitherto been strictly adhered to, and at places where the so-called Line Officers having graduated from the Naval Academy are stationed, engineering officers are not given the right of command for general military operations. The right given to me was limited to the construction of the airfield and I was authorized to merely command my construction battalion under the command of my immediate superiors. (The title of "Engineering" was abolished from November 15, 1942 and accordingly I, too, was promoted to Lieutenant Commander from Engineer Lieutenant.) Therefore, all military operations on the island excepting for the Construction work should be placed under the command of Naval Lieutenant Kishiba (in case of his death 1st Lieutenant Takahashi).

However, being a special duty officer specially promoted from the ranks, Lieutenant Miyaki had no right to command me.

(f) In the circumstances, as regards the question of responsibility in the handling of the POW's for the sake of enabling everything to run smoothly hereafter:

1. The military guards who accompanied the POW's from Rabaul will take charge of all the duties such as supervising and commanding.

2. The foregoing military guards shall be placed under the command of the commanding officer of the two battalions of military troops coming from Erebenta /phonetic/.

3. Our battalion will assume responsibility as regards general maintenance such as food, medical supplies and housing.

That was because our battalion had--although none too much--some quantity of living necessities to spare, whereas the stocks of both the Naval and Military units were scanty (especially the Military unit had nothing at all).

As for this latter, it had been decided that our battalion would hold itself responsible for supplying the needs of not only the POW's, but also of the Military as well as native units.

4. After a few days, about two battalions of military troops arrived on the island as scheduled, and after a conference with the commander of the military forces, it was decided unanimously to put the above three items into effect.

5. The concrete details regarding the construction work were based on the general instructions received by me from the 26th Air Squadron Command (there was a period when I was temporarily under the command of the 204th Air Commander), on the basis of which our staff and the Military staff discussed the allotment of the details for the work, following which instructions were given to the guards by the Military Commander as to the duties

assigned to the POW's on the previous day or early in the morning of the said day. Thus the POW's performed their work under the direct supervision and direction of the guards.

I therefore believe that not even our staff officers meddled directly as regards the work of the POW's, and that everything was carried on smoothly under the hands of the Military authorities.

6. Some of the leading workers of our battalion who were designated by me supervised and directed the work of the native unit, and accordingly apart from our own men, our battalion took direct charge of only the native unit (which I believe numbered about 500 (?) at the most).

7. The supervising and directing of the POW's outside of their working hours was supposed to be undertaken by the 15 POW guards under the command of the Military Commander (Captain Senda at the outset) but, to the best of my memory, I believe that some of them were, at one time, placed under the command of the Miyake Company in connection with the living quarters as well as due to it being more convenient to utilize the look-out station of the Miyake Company for the sake of their daily work as well as air defence operations.

8. After the lapse of several days the Kimbara and Takahashi companies arrived at the Island, and I was placed under the command of Naval Lieutenant Kimbara as a natural result of the Navy's practice in accordance with the provisions of the Naval Command Observance Regulations /T.N. "Gunrei Shoko-Rei"/. The POW's however were handled as mentioned above without any special changes being made.

(g) Conditions at the time of arrival of the POW's on the Island.

1. On watching the POW's as they were disembarking from the transport, although there were some who were extremely "poppy," the majority of them were so weak that they could not walk by themselves and were only barely able to do so with the help of their comrades. Having observed this scene, I could not help from feeling somewhat apprehensive as regards how much contribution could be expected of them towards the rapid construction of the airfield.

2. As there were about 10 (?) medical personnel including a Captain of the Medical Corps (?) as well as other medical men, a medical examination was held by them in conjunction with our battalion's Medical Officer and his subordinates, a result of which it was said that there were many diphtheria patients as well as patients suffering from asthma caused by chronic enteritis (have forgotten the number of cases).

Before being called to the colours, our Battalion's Medical Officer had made a special study regarding Diphtheria and was so well experienced as to have his doctorate thesis on the said subject under consideration at the time, so that I received a report later on that, due to the great interest

shown, and strenuous efforts exerted by him, that the Diphtheria epidemic was stamped out without spreading so much.

It was so arranged that medical supplies and appliances were, whenever necessary, handed to the Medical Officer of the POW Unit en bloc (once a week ?) whenever requests were received from him, and daily diagnoses and medical treatment were effected independently by the POW unit in view of the shortage of hands. Needless to say, of course, in case of emergency our medical officers were to their aid whenever necessary. Consequently, the daily authorization of absence from work owing to illness of all POWs was left entirely to the free discretion of the Chief Medical Officer of the POW unit.

However, a fairly large number of deaths occurred from sickness (as far as I remember, there were times when there were as many as about three deaths in a day) due to the sudden change in living conditions, increased degree of asthonia or the usual aggravated form of diarrhoea due to drinking too much unboiled water.

3. As there were more than ten men connected with cooking including an Intendance Lieutenant, it was arranged that they would handle the cooking independently by speedily erecting a kitchen. It was also arranged that food-stuffs for a week were to be handed to them once a week all at once so that they could cook their own food in their own manner. I recollect that, as the supply officer told me that they specially preferred wheat flour and canned goods to rice, I tried as much as possible to meet their request and think that they were handed to them fairly plentifully. I was once invited to come over to inspect the place once as they had commenced baking bread with the use of oil-drums and coconut oil. Furthermore, tobacco was also supplied to them in accordance with a suggestion from the supply officer.

4. The general state of health of the POWs was, as mentioned above, and as their physical strength had declined considerably, the work they were engaged in throughout the entire period of the construction works consisted only of gathering pebbles from the reef along the shore facing the sea on the Eastern side of the Island (medium and small in size and used for filling in when levelling the runway and loading sand into transport trucks). Besides, I remember that they were engaged a little in cleaning and clearing the airfield and neighboring taxi strips.

I remember also that I did not make them engage at all in labour with pickaxes and shovels, loading and unloading, as well as transportation of heavy goods, because of their weak knees and general declining strength. I think that, after all, the working efficiency throughout the entire period was rather poor in spite of their efforts.

Moreover, some of them volunteered to drive trucks, but this request was never granted as our battalion was amply provided with drivers.

5. Now, although the sharing of the respective responsibilities towards the POWs continued from start to finish as stated above, my battalion conformed to the form of Provisional Enlistment of all the POWs as regards the procedure for supply and accounts as we were providing them with all supplies.

This applies not only to the POWs but also to military units and even to naval personnel under a different jurisdiction. Our Navy makes it their customary practice to adopt such a procedure for supply and accounting reasons in order, for the sake of temporary convenience, to provide food and clothing to those who are not our regular battalion personnel and our battalion also merely followed this practice.

Accordingly, in view of the aforementioned circumstances, the POWs were considered as being a temporary enlisted unit and, in addition to our drawing up the POW muster-roll on the strength of the data submitted by them, any unforeseen occurrences like "Deaths from Sickness" or "Killed in Action" were recorded in my battalion's reports. The object thereof was to satisfy supply and accounting requirements, and I believe that the POW problem will become fully clarified by referring to the said reports.

6. As for the living quarters, being by all means a small island in the first place, there would be no alternative, after constructing a standard air base, than to utilize the remaining space left over. The maximum number of inhabitants on the island exceeded at one time the 6,000 mark so that I was much worried at one time over the selection of the living quarters regarding which the Air Force personnel enjoyed priority selecting rights, but finally this matter was settled by fixing same at a point northwest of the Miyake Company, west of the Military Unit, and southwest of the Takahashi Company, by taking into account the facts that the place was farthest from the airfield and at the same time adjacent to the location of the Military Unit under whose direct command they were. As for the dwelling facilities, inasmuch as the building materials stored by our battalion had been already fairly well used up and as the manner of use of all those on hand had already been decided, there was practically no surplus left over, but finally we succeeded in the speedy construction of a camp sufficient at least to shelter them from rain, by using the materials in store and those procured on the spot.

(h) Important Problems (No. 1)

Several days after the POWs were brought to the Island, approximately two battalions of Army troops which had been under request came from Eleventa /phonetic/ on Bougainville Island. The Commander at that time was Captain Sonda.

Although there may have been incidental aims in the Army occupation, I believe that they strived to assist in the Navy's airfield work and receive all rations from the Navy in the meantime, and lighten the burden on the main force, instead of uselessly and aimlessly awaiting the arrival of armament.

As regards the actual problem of construction work, a definite talk between Captain Sonda and myself was held and a division of work was established. It was the work which is to be carried out by the Army should be commanded by Captain Sonda and that the Naval Construction Battalion should never directly interfere with any work of the Army. It is, moreover, a matter of course that no interference whatsoever should be made directly or indirectly in matters aside from Naval construction work. One day, several days after the occupation by the Army, there was an incident of mistaken firing upon the island by an Army force that was passing by. Directly after this, Captain Sonda suggested that we should now take plans for the defense of the island and that studies and trainings were needed. However, since I am originally from the Navy Engineering Department and have some knowledge of engineering matters, but had neither knowledge, experience nor training in this matter /T. N. defense/, besides which I had no power of command. Therefore, I immediately requested Captain Sonda to draw up the plans, and it was hurriedly decided in the names of Captain Sonda and myself to adopt this plan temporarily until the arrival of Naval Commanding Officer who would direct me. However, several days later, the Kinbara Company came to the island, so I submitted to Lieutenant (S.G.) Kinbara /T.N. Navy/ the defense plans, and asked him to revise and establish same appropriately in the capacity of the Naval Commanding Officer.

In one part of this defense plan there was an item to the effect that prisoners will be disposed of in case the danger of an enemy landing becomes imminent. I remember that the method was by use of hand grenades and that it was up to one company of the Army forces (I do not remember the Company that was designated). A glance at the defense plan of the time in question will reveal this.

After Lieutenant Kinbara came to the island, the defense plan of Ballale Island was newly established and promulgated in the name of the Commanding Officer of the Navy Guard Unit. According to this plan, my Construction Battalion was to be a reserve unit, and was to withdraw to the opposite side from where the enemy makes an invasion, and await orders there. I do not remember other details, especially how matters such as

concerted action with the Army were decided. However, my sole duty was to exert my attention and efforts in regard to commanding and guiding my non-combatant subordinates in the form of approximately 800 workers as well as approximately 120 petty officers and men so as to minimize the casualties among these men as far as possible.

I believe it was in the early part of January 1943 that Naval Captain MIKI came to the island as the Supreme Commander, for the purpose of commanding the combined Army - Navy forces on Bellale Island. However, before he was in office for three months, he returned to Japan proper.

Before and after the time Captain MIKI took his office, the Army forces were being repeatedly replaced, and although I do not remember in detail the staff officers and the unit designations, I believe that the Army strength was generally and gradually decreased. I think this was only natural, as far as the Army's duties were concerned. I do not know whether or not the details of the Island's defense plan were changed while Captain MIKI was in office.

(i) Important Problems (No. 2)

In the meantime, the POWs did not readily recover from their asthenic condition which was attributed to diphtheria, chronic inflammation of the intestines, and other diseases from which they were suffering from even before their arrival to the Island, as mentioned in the foregoing. The number of deaths gradually increased. We, especially the medical officer and other persons concerned, did as much as possible, but the enemy's air raids became more and more intense as the days passed, and the casualties continued to increase. Patients suffering from exhaustion due to air raids carried out day and night, and other causes, continued to appear from all the units. At that time, as far as the Navy was concerned, our unit was the only one which had a medical officer, and all the other companies had only non-rated medical men. Being as such, the medical treatment of all the navy officers and men was charged to the medical officer and the medical ensign of our unit. At one time, even in our unit, about half of the men were ill in bed, and the situation was such that actually the medical staff were so busy as to have no time to spare. Later, I remember that it became absolutely impossible to deal with the situation so that we had a medical Lieutenant (J.G.) from the First Base Headquarters at Buin, and subsequently another medical Lieutenant (J.G.) from Lt. Kimbara's main unit came to our aid, as a result of which we finally succeeded in tiding over the crisis.

The names, dates of death, nature of diseases of the dead prisoners should be listed in my unit's Administrative Bulletin's File, so a glance will reveal them. I, the Chief of the unit that was in charge of medical treatment, feel extremely sorry that there were so many illnesses and deaths. However, on the other hand, at the time, the enemy's attacks became more

severe each day, without a single day's respite from the air raids. The POWs were in a weakened condition even before their arrival at the Island, and medical treatment could not be given them as I wished. Materials and supply situation became more difficult each day on our front line islands, and hands became short. It can also be thought that in view of the prevailing situation the result was truly unavoidable. The construction of the airfield did not progress as anticipated. Although the days passed by being hotly pressed /T.N. to speed up construction work/ and under mental agony and uneasiness, no orders or instructions from anywhere ever came to me until the end in regard to the handling of the POWs. What I feel most at the present time is that, if the POWs were employed for some appropriate work in the rear zone in a quiet and wide area far from Rabaul, it might have been another matter, but, I believe that it might be considered as unreasonable to use the POWs and limited working power by massing them into concentrated units on a front line island where such ceaseless combat was carried out repeatedly.

Now, regarding the disposition of the corpses, there were opinions that if that small island where many people were passed and engaged in hard work became surrounded by grave-posts, it would influence everyone's morale to a great extent. Therefore, at first practically all of them were buried at sea, but due to the heat of the tropics, decomposition was rapid, so that there were opinions that this was intolerable as well as pitiful for both the dead and the burial parties. However, cremation was given up not so much because of fuel, but from the standpoint of air defense in connection with the rising of smoke. Consequently they were buried in the ground after that.

(j) Important Problems (No. 3)

It might have been around the middle of March, 1943, that there was a sudden air raid at night. Many bombs were dropped in the Army area, the POW area, and the Takahashi Company area, where there was practically no damage until then. There were three direct hits by large type bombs in the area where the POWs resided, resulting in 280 (this figure is not accurate. Should be recorded in the Battalion's Administrative Bulletin's File) some odd prisoners being blasted or burnt to death. The reason why there were so many casualties was because this spot was away from the approach course to the airfield and had not been bombed before, so it is said that most of the men, feeling confident, did not take any action to shelter themselves from the air raid.

I believe that it might have been at this time that Lt. Takahashi, the Naval Company Commander, too, was killed in action.

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I have forgotten whether it was toward the end of March, or the beginning of April, 1943, but anyhow, around evening one day we received

an urgent dispatch order from the headquarters at Buin to the following effect: "Several enemy cruisers and destroyers are cruising off Mono Island, and as a landing is most probable, all the units are to immediately prepare to check the enemy landing." By this time, the actual number of POWs had already dropped considerably to some 90 odd men (less than 100 at any rate). Excepting those connected with the kitchen, I believe most of the men had lost a great deal of their vigour. From the standpoint of the condition of troop equipment at the time, and also from the topography of the island, in the face of a powerful enemy assault, there were only two alternatives, total victory or total annihilation. In fact I believe that the latter seemed to be anticipated more strongly. I do not think that it was an unreasonable reasoning for all the men to resign themselves to death after eliminating "the fear of the tiger at the rear door" /T.N. refers to the POWs/. From such thought, the above-mentioned POWs were all bayoneted to death by an Army company charged with the duty in accordance with the previously established defense plan. (I do not know the unit designation. It is said that hand grenades were not used). All the units made preparations, feverishly working on defense measures against the enemy's surprise assault landing, and waited throughout the night, but the enemy did not attack this island after all.

Actually, I believe that the difficult and unfavorable turn of the battle situation strained our nerves to an extreme, and excited us too much /T.N. resulting in the killing of the POWs/. It can only be said that the Company merely followed the rules of the plan of defense mechanically, but I consider that same was also unavoidable in some respects, especially when placed face to face with such a tense situation.

(1) Important Problems (No. 5)

This matter concerns a certain First Lieutenant (both status and name unknown) who was shot to death on the very day of the landing. I believe a record of this case is set forth at the beginning of the report concerning POWs who were under the charge of my Battalion.

It was when the POW party was landed on this island, as a result of the negotiations which are mentioned in another section, with the Army officer who was in charge of them, it was arranged that the POWs should remain temporarily on this island. When I believed the said commander had returned to his transport vessel, he again appeared before me with a POW who was under arrest and being dragged along by soldiers, and said: "On returning to the ship, I found this POW had been arrested as he had tried secretly to escape by jumping into the water and swimming towards Shortland Island. So the number of POWs I reported to you before was less one. Will you receive him together with the others?" As for me, I did not know what to do. And, moreover, what I could do with such a man as he, who had dared try to escape even in such an environment, especially here, on this solitary island surrounded by water on all sides? Therefore I gave him a

firm refusal. He pressed me to accept him, saying, as before, that he had to attend to other duties at once and begged me to manage in some way or other. Then I questioned him as to what measure would be taken by the Army. He answered that in case of escape in the face of the enemy this would naturally be punished by death. As the matter had to be settled at once and, also, from the standpoint of our naval discipline, I simply believed that escape in the face of the enemy in wartime should as a matter of course call for capital punishment. I thought, also, that it could not be avoided from the viewpoint of making it an example for the strict enforcement of military discipline on this island in the future. Without any further consideration it was decided to execute him in the presence of both of us. And, finally, the Army guards shot him to death with their rifles on the beach near the secluded jungle on the eastern coast of the Island. (Presumably, these soldiers belonged under the aforesaid Army officer and were not the 15 guards attached to the POW unit). At first, I intended to behead him with my Japanese sword. But, at the last moment, I became timid and therefore could not do so. Since this happened, I have pondered over the case and have always felt the pangs of conscience. Not only have I been cautioning myself ever since against repeating such an action in the future, in whatever circumstances, but I also strictly warned my men not to act cruelly in speech or action towards the POWs. I feel my responsibility very acutely, especially in the case of this certain First Lieutenant.

III. Supplementary Remarks

I have found in the newspaper of the morning of 19th January 1946 that my arrest has been ordered as a war crime suspect. As I had been anyhow the central figure of the building work of the airfield on Ballale Island where had occurred the deaths of more than 500 POWs, I had already presumed that I would be the first to be so designated. But taking into consideration that, firstly, the time was extremely early, and secondly, that only I, who had no substantial power of command but only a superficial one, and who had been only a commander of construction work as it were, was so designated and no names of those with whom I had been acquainted were mentioned, I supposed that the investigation on the spot might have been surprisingly incomplete; consequently I was worried that, if I should make my appearance at once, I should be obliged to bring forward the names of too many other persons or would have to state matters which are unnecessary to mention in order to clarify all the facts in detail for the sake of impartial judgment; unless I were resolved to lay down my life, shouldering all the responsibilities by myself, letting everything to be left unsaid (although I have lost such a frame of mind now as I have been informed of the truths of various disclosed facts during nearly one year after the cessation of hostilities). Furthermore, I felt very pained at the idea of being placed under arrest which I had been taught traditionally as being a disgrace and I imprudently tried to escape this as long as possible as the result of various illusions. In the course of time, however,

I became convinced that I would not be able to conceal myself forever and also came to believe that the true facts concerning this matter might have been already investigated in detail and disclosed, then those which I would be obliged to state might probably have been already investigated in full detail and known, consequently the worry which I had as above-mentioned has ceased to exist as being uncalled for and no longer necessary. On or about the 25th of July, through the aid of the advice from a friend of mine, I learned that my flight had given much trouble to my relations, acquaintances and friends; furthermore he told me that such conduct had become an obstacle to Japan's faithful fulfillment of her obligations in connection with her acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration, implying that I was showing direct disloyalty to the state. When I came to think it over I became really shocked.

Ever since I decided to escape I had been thinking that it would be simple enough to kill myself if the worst should come, which amounted to nothing if I considered that I had died in the Solomons, and I should be able to shoulder all responsibilities by committing suicide. Although I made light of such matter, still I found that it could not be carried out so easily when the critical moment arrived. Since the latter part of July, I gave this matter thorough consideration, arranged all my personal matters in order, and after bidding farewell to my close relatives whom I asked to look after my family, on July 30 I gave myself up to a member of the Hoshimoto Police Station, Wakayama Prefecture, and I have remained here ever since. I realize that my responsibility is heavy for having evaded justice for nearly six months.

Now I should like to be subjected to impartial judgment, by stating all the facts most frankly and exposing everything to light. Individual subjects which I have written in this document may be identified and clarified still further by comparing same with the records of that time.

(The End)

This confession of mine represents, in its entirely, a frank description of actual facts, and contains no false statements.

The writer of the above:

Norihiko Ozaki

/fingerprint/

August 8, 1946.

「ハサウエー等の米軍兵捕獲事件」

C9412

元「ハサウエー」艦長

尾崎 審彦

[1] A

ハサウエー艦長の「記述」によると、過去の軍事記憶によれば、
 船の記述は「1月14日午前8時刻」から数十分間は明確。
 しかし、それが多分入水して船の水没後、軍事記憶は不明瞭。
 記録を参考して明白にしたところ、1月14日午前8時刻解き離
 て、午前10時

〔一〕 経過概要

(1) 本部隊は「至るところ」で進出や失敗の経験から、
 「当時待機する」ところ、「進出」の問題、「行場」の問題、「
 行場」を考慮して行場を設けたと命令された直前に(1月14
 日午前10時)

(2) 当時同艦は艦長、副艦長、三等兵等の乗組員で構成され、
 「行場」は「行場」の意味で行場を設けた。下記手記は「
 行場」の意味で「行場」を設けたものである。
 本部隊は下記艦長、副艦長、三等兵等の乗組員で構成され、
 「行場」は「行場」の意味で行場を設けたものである。

当時当艦は「ハサウエー」艦長、船出船隊長、副艦長、
 三等兵等の乗組員で構成され、行場を設けたものである。

〔二〕 本部隊は「ハサウエー」艦長、船出船隊長、副艦長、
 三等兵等の乗組員で構成され、行場を設けたものである。

第一回一應完成せり。作業二回は約四千九百人を捕獲するといふ算だ

の事である。

然るに四千名の増援隊は待てども有らじと到着しよとな。只一時、アラモド島第四建設部の派遣六百人(約三百人)が二日位で、アラモド島にて轉進しのうやうした。尼モだの隊員も過半數が病人で大した勞働力の期待不出するのもさはなりよした。

さて、隊としてはアラモド島に在る陸軍兵力を作業に供へ、援護を請うる。及ば附近の島々アラモド島、シヨートン島、アラモド島主計長軍医、軍医官、化學所長、隊員五隊で各たゞ宣傳の島を宣傳して、勞働力を利用する事に取れり。アラモド島

(ア)同島へ進出へから數日後と思ひますか、或日アラモド島にて、入オサツ輸送船が投錨し、捕虜らもまた數百名が本島に上陸とは、一の事だ。其のうち陸軍少尉以上記憶す。指揮官が私どもにか云ひて「アベルから命令で陸軍捕虜五百名を連れて来た。これは貴地飛行場設営作業に使役されよう」と云ふ意味のこと申述べます。そ當時智方には海軍の最高方司令部第1第2第3六航空隊隊長の私と指揮官系統の上司が、何等の隊員も指名も命令も未云ひませんで、一應拒絶します。

ところが右アラモド島軍一将校は、其の本因は、實は楊陸次才出隊にて、次行動に移るには云う様命令を下さる。自分が隊伍次第、貴方に対する上司を廻て、筋道正へ行へる。在島中の捕虜監禁を許す取扱は、全部陸軍がやるとの意味で云ふ。

小二年た十五名、陸軍監督官、軍医、軍医官、軍医士等が、

第一回 完成せず、作業は約四千石の、主権復讐と云ふ意の
ものであります。

然るに四千石の増援隊は待てども荷りと到着しませぬ。只一時、ア
クシ島第四建設部の派遣士官が来三日一月にが二日は二日位で、原以
ハシタレト轉進しのうやうした。尼モハ隊員も過半數が病人で大した
弱効力。期待不出まつはもつてはあります。

さて、隊としてはアクシ島に在る陸軍火力を作業に供へ
援方總調査事務所、及ば附近の島々アクシ島、シヨートンド、アラウロ
等主計長軍医、軍需官化所要の隊員五隊で各地を宣撫。ア島
人を産導してアラウロ効力を利用。主と取扱がかりす。

(ア) 同島へ進出之から數日後と思ひます。が或日アラウロ生々然可なり。入
オナリ船足船が投錨と捕虜、らよき數百名が本島に上陸とは
一の事。之の中、陸軍久野へ記憶す。指揮官が私事と
にやく来て、ハカルから命令で陸軍を捕虜立百姓と名を連れて不義
ニ在る者を飛行場設官作業に使役されよといふ意味
のと申述べます。で當時智方には海軍の最高司令部軍令第3
六航空隊隊長の私と指揮官系統の上司からは何等の隊員立
指名も命令も未だなされて、二隻拒絶す。

ところが右アラウロ將校は、おこなはる。實は楊陸次才出港で
之の行動は移らねば云う様命令立事一時。自分か段住次第
實方上校は上司を通じて筋道を折る。在島中の捕虜
監督官は取締部は全部陸軍がやる。主の意味で云ふ
本島に十五名、陸軍監督官は伍長官了。陸軍監督官

16 Sept 1968

在所下取扱つてよい三ヶ月命令全下り水は指揮も置けてほの居りて
目今は是れに就く（是れ）の實力にて

並て私、吉喜を指揮と許へて申上、遂て是下り、私は三十海軍機関
與學校車並り機関科將校にて、然て軍事委員會、海軍
人となりて、從事外日本、海軍には軍令委員會が統率とて
在所し、海軍兵學校車並り、所謂、機関科將校のほゝ地に於ては機
關科將校は一般軍事行動に、指揮の權限を與へて居る、私に
許さるゝ了確限は飛行場の設営に、内して、ナ直屬上官の指揮
下に於て自己の設営降下指揮し得る、方々車掌の外であります。

（昭和二十年青島より機関車足御車くす私モ機自ト駆カリ海軍が佐々木
即ち同島に於ては設営作業を降下（一般軍事的行動に就ては
總て、金原海軍大尉（金原不耐死すは高橋海軍中尉）の指揮は
降下べきであります）

但し、三山若海軍大尉は水兵から降退、特勢士官在支政私指揮すの權限
ありまん

（八）生徒今後萬事を内滑り當たるに、捕虜の取扱と、眞似の所
ト教示は

（一）「ラバウル」より捕虜に附隨して未下陸軍砲兵備兵が、乞留被
指揮一切の立派教習と擔當する。

（二）「モヘンタ」から未駐する、未下陸の陸軍部隊指揮官が、前記り
陸軍警備兵を指揮する。

（三）当隊上は食糧品、治療品の支給と、給食品の店舗、同保施設等
一般施設の責任を負ふ。

並ばれ隊以外の海軍部隊も、陸軍部隊も、何れも、（モヘンタ）
が勤へ候（陸軍は皆無）、食糧を支給し、當隊上は、（モヘンタ）

1955年1月1日，蘇聯總理赫魯曉夫訪華，毛澤東在中南海紫光閣會見赫魯曉夫。


新嘉坡總理在會上說：「我們希望在殖民地的人民，能有機會在殖民地的議會上，提出他們的意見。」

(四) 一日一个样本的测定结果，其结果与前一结果的差数，即为平行测定的精密度。

(六) 为谋幹部三頭。一部之首，^如楊名士之大部，傅作霖之重督，督撫之大部，三者皆為各部頭頭。如大部隊長，^如朱培德之頭頭，^如各部隊長。

(七) 作業時間外に於ける体操、散歩、自衛、軍事訓練等軍部隊
指揮官の命令が最初の場合は、山田は第一討伐隊長、中島は第三討伐隊長、大谷は第五討伐隊長、各軍
兵士は各自の軍種を知る事に於ける事で、各軍地区的關係である。
日課は午前六時より午後三時までである。即ち折合利軍事訓練
にて一部三十分半小時合て勤務の所で二時半が折合利軍事訓練
である。

Belgrave Regis
8 April '01



43 | *What can I do to help?* (20) *What can I do to help?* (20)

What would be your estimate of the number of species of plants and animals in the world?

參照上文，我們可以知道，這兩句話的含義是完全一樣的。

居住施設七種導導保育漁村住民工相處問題現有方案便
適用於本方案之小島漁村導導上漁村工農戶一體化小島漁村
導導方案之實地調查漁村工作用上兄弟七項問題之渡過之期會在小
程度上會設置漁村工農戶一體化

(チ) 重音問題(二)

補為參謀，後數日至總之館，已停頓中，為之送軍部備約
云：大隊去了，「アリゲト」之日，歸「アリゲト」，如以連
隊之未歸，不
當時，指揮官仙田陸軍大尉，工兵一連。
陸軍連社。目的，也令附隨的，連隊之連隊長，為之連社之連
慢，然一連隊之連隊長，為之連隊之連隊長，為之連隊之連
而，此向一切之給付，為連隊之連隊長，為之連隊之連
在？大連之連隊。

但這兩種方法都沒有達到我們的目的，因為它們都沒有考慮到我們在前面所說的那樣，

(チ) 重要問題(之二)

桶井義馬は後日正経と船乙作輔中佐が陸軍部外
云大隊が「アーティルリード」の連隊である。
當時の指揮官は仙田陸軍大尉である。
陸軍連隊の目的は、付隨的に陸軍の各部隊を支え、
必然共謀の敵を討伐するのである。連隊は行場正義と中博二
名の向ひの金輪寺の連隊が、陸軍本隊の連隊と併せて、
在りたる連隊である。

此。彷彿計惠一項。設前半年的充份心力。這次在某場合
博覽會上。所作的小項目。第一。是方濟各福傳。有
簡單的解釋。二。中華(舊約記憶)。該傳。是中華
舊約記憶。三。中華舊約。彷彿計惠。第四。總計。中華
舊約。

指揮者、是誰呢？他就是我所說的「音樂魔術師」。

第一、技术上来说,这三件事都是可以做到的。——李锐

本办法未作前依照行政部颁行之办法执行。行办法中之
（五）部分将依照行办法之规定执行。本办法之执行
（六）办法之执行。行办法之执行。本办法之执行。

1462

(1) $\frac{1}{2} \times 10^3$ (m/s)

本集之標題或以日文之題名為主，或以中文之題名為主，或以中文之題名為主，或以中文之題名為主。

（六）重要問題（第六回）

(11) 審酌問題 (七八四)

題目(或問題)的題目和題旨已經定下來了(或說是題旨已經定下來了)。題旨定下來之後，題目和題旨的關係，就是題旨是題目的根據，題目是題旨的具體化。

之七 諸向默向不利化芳利化二佳口舌方。人心若極度之醉
後之興亡則追之而無用。二方而一者。醉者。規定也。醉者
之斷行也。忘其外也。王曰。斯之不醉者。猶而之有酒
之忘或更反上者也。醉者。忘其外也。而上者也。風也。考之。人之醉

(才) 壓西問題 (七八五)

和隊。捕獲魚肉供你選食。最初上記錄之水之活魚一尾之魚
才於上岸當日統計之水魚共中活魚(即今布布水之活魚
下)。每尾之魚重一磅。

本件被捕事前係於本埠二十二年六月當時列車之來三指揮官。該軍行駛之列車一記不詳不應酬。後在六月。歸之。一時捕獲之頭目。即上車。一枚手槍走船。故得逃。其後即不知所歸。該軍來之捕獲。本來捕獲。即為本埠。前記之指揮官。而此人即之。即一軍官。即為。故云。六月。捕獲。即為。本埠。二十二年。六月。即為。乙逃。即為。本埠。二十二年。六月。即為。本埠。六月。即為。

(三) 附录四

那年三月廿日過海到前門，候候他，他說他過海來。

〔三〕 五之子

14

Elmer May
✓

(卷二)

私の此の告白は全部事実を本直に
説いておりてある種の傷にかかる
はあません。右記著者 廣野喜作
昭和二年八月一日

萬和三月一日

1997年秋

2018/10/19 Doc 54225 (cont.)

至千里より成ル云據前記ノ合意ハ貢貢渠内通
通行ニテ尾崎義郎ノ OSAKI TOSHIHIKO ノガ余
ノ口面ニ於テ右通譯ヲモツテ語ノ通譯ヲノ禁シム
ルモニシテ一九四六年ノ四月二十一年ノ八月云
八日余ノ口面ニ於テソノ内情ノ氏情アルコトヲ宣
達セリ。

英語訳文書は筆記録部に記入

少佐 H. S. WILLIAMS
エイチ・エス・ウイリアムスノ署名ノ